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ABSTRACT	   The Lisbon Summit was important for two reasons. Firstly, the 
acceptance of a new strategic concept, the seventh since NATO  was 
founded. The new concept comes after the Al Kaide attacks, the Afghan and 
Iraq wars and a greater threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 
addition, relations with Russia were reset, making them of strategic 
importance. The second important aspect is the acceptance of a missile 
defence system whereby all  populations, territory and forces will be 
protected. 
	  
Every NATO summit in its own right is 
important. Yet when a new 
strategic concept is adopted a 
summit  can be considered as  a 
milestone. The Lisbon Summit 
adopted the seventh strategic 
concept since NATO’s inception, 
which means that almost every 
decade a new concept ihas been 
adopted. Given the changing 
circumstances of the balance of 
power among states this is 
inevitable. 
After the 1999 Washington summit, 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 
menace of Al Kaide necessitated 
the adoption of a new concept. 
NATO became engaged in 
Afghanistan, the US and some 
NATO allies invaded Iraq, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons 
became more acute and relations 
with Russia had to be “reset.” The 
world is no longer unipolar. Power is 
shifting to the East from the West. 
Moreover, the global financial crisis 
and defence costs are inevitably 
linked. Now NATO forces are 
engaged in “out of area” actions 
and their defence requires new 
force structures and weapons. Giles 
Merritt, Director of Security and 
Defence Agenda at the Atlantic 
Council of Turkey‘s 18th International 
Conference in Antalya on 
December 3, 2010 aptly pointed 
out that new force structures and 
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weapons systems are necessary to 
meet the changing risks and 
challenges. 
Last but not least, the public wants 
to know why NATO is stil needed. 
 
The Strategic Concept 
The Lisbon strategic concept is 
shorter and punchier than the one 
adopted in Washington and one 
that the public can better 
understand. This is an important 
change, as In times of financial 
crisis, public and parliamentary 
support become all the more 
necessary. 
Regarding content, whereas the 
Washington text listed five core 
tasks for the Alliance – security, 
consultations, 
deterrence and 
defence, crisis 
management and 
partnerships – the 
new text has 
narrowed those tasks 
to three: collective 
defence, crisis 
management and 
cooperative security. 
This numerical 
change does not 
mean that 
consultations are left out, since 
paragraph five of the new text in 
indicates that NATO remains the 
unique and essential transatlantic 
forum for consultations. If one were 
to search for differences in wording, 
what catches one’s eye is that in 
the Washington text under crisis 
management the word consensus 
exists whereas the new text has 
omitted the word consensus. In 
addition, Article 10 of the Lisbon 
text puts greater stress on the threat 
posed by terrosim by indicating 
that it is a “direct threat.” 
NATO’s open door policy continues. 
However, there are two limitations, 
the first one geographic: only 
European democracies can be 
members. The second one, in my 
view, is political. How a potential 
candidate for membership affects 
relations with Russia is the key.  
And this brings me to relations with 
Russia. Here the biggest difference 
between the 1999 Washington 
concept and 2010 Lisbon concept 
is relations with Russia. Paragraph 
36 of the Washington text speaks of 
NATO-Russia Founding Act as the 
basis. In paragraphs 33 ve 34 of the 
Lisbon text, much 
stronger language is 
used on the 
importance of close 
relations with Russia, 
that cooperation 
with Russia is of 
strategic importance. 
Indeed, this is the 
consequence of the 
“reset” of relations 
between the US and 
Russia. Russia is not a 
member of NATO but 
has a weight almost that of a 
member. 
Similarly, Paragraph 32 of the Lisbon 
text is much warmer on NATO-EU 
relations than the old strategic 
concept, and the EU is now 
considered an “essential partner.” 
This is meaningful since President 
Obama has sometimes been 
accused of ignoring the EU. Here of 
NATO’s open door policy 
continues. However, there 
are two limitations, the first 
one geographic: only 
European democracies can 
be members. The second 
one, in my view, is political. 
How a potential candidate 
for membership affects 
relations with Russia is the 
key.  
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course, Turkey-Cyprus relations 
remains a sticking point. 
 
Missile Defence System 
For the implementation of the 
concept, political guidance will be 
prepared. Naturally, the Lisbon 
Summit and the strategic concept 
should be read together with the 
summit declaration. Paragraph 37 
of the Declaration deals with 
Ballistic Missile Defence, which was 
the main menu of the Summit. 
Conceived in 2002 by President 
Bush, the system then intended to 
defend NATO deployed forces and 
was to be fixed on the ground. It 
was not a NATO project aimed at 
protecting from ICBM’s. President 
Obama changed the concept to 
also protect NATO European 
populations, territory and forces. 
President Obama has promoted a 
less costly, more flexible and 
phased system of radars and anti-
ballistic missiles that 
will have 
components in 
Europe and at sea. 
(the phases of which 
are against short 
range missiles, 
medium range 
missiles and long 
range missiles and 
ICBM’s.) The cost, 
according to a NATO spokesman, 
will be 1.5 billion to be managed 
over ten years. In President 
Obama’s words, for the first time 
“we have agreed to develop a 
missile defence capability that is 
strong enough to cover all NATO 
European territory and populations 
as well as the United States.” 
According to a document that 
appeared in the Wikileaks cables, 
there was a fear that Turkey might 
spoil the party. There was 
recognition that Turkey’s voice 
would be louder. Turkey had said 
three things on the missile defence: 
a) The system should not be placed 
against a certain country (which 
means Iran should not be named). 
b) It should cover all NATO territory. 
c) It should be a NATO project 
under NATO command and 
control. 
According to a cable published by 
Wikileaks, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
told President Barack Obama that 
“the project must be implemented 
in a NATO context to diminish the 
political cost that his government 
will likely bear both in terms of 
domestic politics and in Turkey’s 
relations with Iran.” The American 
side wondered “how much NATO 
will be enough for 
Turkish leaders.” 
Despite denials by 
Turks that the US had 
made a proposal to 
base an AN/TPY-2 
(transportable radar 
surveillance) and 
other missile defence 
assets in Turkey, a 
secret cable from the US Embassy in 
Ankara says the opposite. Indeed, 
the cable reads the following: “We 
have made the point to the Turks 
that a decision to not base the 
AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey is 
essentially a decision to opt out of 
missile defence coverage for 
Turkey; this would not be a political 
Obama said  that for the first 
time “we have agreed to 
develop a missile defence 
capability that is strong 
enough to cover all NATO 
European territory and 
populations as well as the 
United States”.  
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consequence, but just a fact based 
on physics and geometry.” Turkey’s 
main concern seems to be relations 
with Iran as Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu, called the Iranian 
Foreign Minister after the Lisbon 
Summit to brief him on Summit 
decisions, which, in my view, is an 
unprecedented act. Another 
unmentioned concern on the part 
of Turkey seems to be whether 
Israel will benefit from the missile 
defence system. Turkey believes 
that this would not be necessary 
since the system exists already for 
Israel. 
The missile defence system has 
been the main menu of President 
Obama’s NATO approach 
strengthening the transatlantic link. 
If Turkey had vetoed that system at 
Lisbon, this would have 
marginalised Turkey in 
NATO and would 
have damaged US-
Turkey relations 
immeasurably. Still, 
tough negotiations 
are ahead of us until 
the report on 
basing, command 
and control 
technical details are 
presented to NATO 
defence ministers. If 
the radar is based in 
Turkey, Patriot and 
THAAD systems will 
probably be 
needed to protect 
the radars. It is said that radars will 
be provided by the US at no cost. 
The US will provide the missiles 
protecting the radars. Costs of anti-
ballistic missiles will be borne 
nationally as needs of each country 
are different. Should Turkey opt out 
of the system, this would have 
political consequences. Turkey has 
said that it is not threatened by 
Iranian missiles. However, Turkey 
was planning to set up its own 
national missile defence system. If 
that were not for Iran, then one can 
legitimately ask who then? 
 
Global NATO 
As far as membership in NATO is 
concerned,  membership cannot 
be global at least for geographic 
reasons: the Alliance is limited to 
Europe. But the challenges are 
global and this forces the Alliance 
to act globally. To what extent the 
Alliance will act globally will 
depend on several factors. The first 
is the war in Afghanistan. How will 
Afghanistan and 
Pakistan look like after 
Alliance forces leave 
is an important 
element. The second, 
no less important 
factor, is relations with 
Russia. If cooperation 
with Russia goes well 
then the Alliance will 
tend to act more 
freely globally. 
Perhaps the litmus test 
lies in Russia’s 
partnership in the 
missile defence 
system. If relations with 
Russia sour, will the latter try to beef 
up Collective Security Cooperation 
Treaty Organisation as a rival to 
NATO? Or will it turn to Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation? How 
will the EU’s military capacities fare 
in the coming decade? The present 
 
The costs of anti-ballistic 
missiles will be borne 
nationally as needs of each 
country are different. 
Should Turkey opt out of the 
system, this would have 
political consequences. 
Turkey has said that it is not 
threatened by Iranian 
missiles. However, Turkey 
was planning to set up its 
own national missile 
defence system. 
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financial crisis does not augur well 
for  the EU in the military field. Last 
but not least is the question of the 
cohesion of the Alliance. Giles 
Merritt believes that ”unthinking EU 
support for US ‘adventurism‘ is over; 
Europeans would  support the US 
when its strength is needed and US 
policies are acceptable.” This is in 
addition to Turkey’s new attitude. 
The challenges and risks are global; 
just how global they will be will 
largely depend on those factors. 
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